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Health Insurance Reform and Its Effects on the 
Small Employer Market: A Review of H.R. 3626 
P. Anthony Hammond* 
Abstractt 
This paper provides a detailed analysis of H.R. 3626, a bill that is intended to 
improve employers' and employees' access to health care. H.R. 3626 attempts 
to accomplish this through the use of guaranteed availability, community rat-
ing, and generous standard benefits. A migration model is used to analyze the 
impact of H.R. 3626. Using this model, it is shown that while improving the 
availability and affordability of health insurance, its rating restrictions increase 
premiums disproportionately for the majority of small employers. In addition, 
H.R. 3626 increases the number of uninsured small employers. 
Key words and phrases: rating restrictions, community rating, cost contain-
ment, redistributional effects, migration effects 
1 Introduction 
The majority of Americans obtain their health insurance coverage 
through an employer-provided health plan. In spite of this fact, many 
* Anthony Hammond, A.S.A., M.A.A.A., is an associate director and actuary policy at 
the Health Insurance Association of America. His responsibilities include assessing the 
costs and implications of federal and state health care reform proposals. 
Mr. Hammond's address is: Health Association of America, 1025 Connecticut Avenue 
NW, Washington DC 20036-3998, USA. 
Mr. Hammond thanks the editor and the anonymous referees for their numerous 
helpful comments and suggestions. 
tThis paper is a revision of an analysis prepared for the Health Insurance Associ-
ation of America. Given the current debate on national health care reform, I hope to 
provide some insights into the methodologies that may be used to analyze the impact 
of health insurance market reforms and impart an appreciation for the actuarial com-
plexity inherent in these reforms and the consequences of these reforms for insurers, 
employers, and employees. 
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working Americans are still uninsured, especially those who work for 
small employers. 1 One may argue that the main reason why these work-
ers are uninsured may have more to do with economics than insurance. 
Yet there are problems in the small employer health insurance market 
that are exacerbating the problem of the working uninsured. BaSically, 
these are problems of access, affordability, and coverage. 
Several small group reform proposals dealing with these problems 
have been presented to the United States Congress.2 These proposals 
generally promulgate restrictions on health insurance premiums and 
cost containment measures to improve affordability; require insurers 
to issue and guarantee renewal of policies to small employer groups 
in order to improve access (availability) of health insurance; and pro-
vide portability (continuity) of coverage when employers or individuals 
change carriers or jobs or when insurers leave the market. 
In spite of their similarities, however, the various proposals are of-
ten quite different in their specific provisions. One major difference is 
how much premiums are allowed to vary (rating restrictions) and the 
definition of a small employer. The question remains, however, as to 
how effec;tive these proposals are at resolving some or all of the prob-
lems in the small employer market and whether the cost exceeds the 
benefits to small employers, their employees, insurers, and society as 
a whole. 
This paper examines the efficacy of H.R. 3626, The Health Insur-
ance Reform and Cost Control Act of 1991. H.R. 3626 includes all of 
the approaches mentioned above and goes one step further. It estab-
lishes a minimum standard for benefits that must be covered by a small 
employer health insurance plan. H.R. 3626 does not include, however, 
reforms such as health risk adjusters, employer mandates, or individ-
ual health insurance reforms. Discussion of these reforms is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
The ability of H.R. 3626 to improve access, affordability, and cover-
age in the small employer market is analyzed using data from Health 
Insurance Association of America3 (HIAA) member companies and two 
1 A small employer is defined throughout this paper to be an employer that employs 
two to 50 employees. 
2 As of October 1994, the United States Congress has been unable to pass comprehen-
sive health care reform legislation. So the focus of the health care reform debate has 
returned to insurance market reforms such as those proposed just a few years ago for 
small employers. Although these reforms are called incremental by policymakers, they 
will have a considerable impact on insurers, as these reforms represent a significant 
departure from past insurance practices. 
3The Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) is a Washington, D.C.-based 
trade association of the United States' leading commercial insurance carriers. HIAA 
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actuarial models. One model analyzes the impact of rating restrictions 
on a sample of small employers insured by five different commercial 
insurers. The other model (called a migration model) combines the rel-
ative morbidity (net claim cost) of each segment of the changing small 
employer population in order to estimate the change (as a result of H.R. 
3626) in the average premium of all small employers insured by small 
group insurers. 
The insurers chosen for this study represent five insurers with sig-
nificant sales in the commercial, small employer, group health insur-
ance market. The insurers reflect the broad spectrum of underwriting 
practices that are experienced in the market: from carriers with demo-
graphic rating (premiums vary based on age, sex, area, family status) to 
carriers with aggressive underwriting. Further, while an effort is made 
to obtain data from a group of carriers that is representative of the small 
employer group market, it is not possible to determine accurately how 
representative these carriers are. Therefore, the estimates should not 
be considered as industry estimates but as the composite experience 
of five insurers. The results presented in this paper are averages, so it 
always should be kept in mind that specific insurers and employers will 
have results that will be higher or lower than the average. In addition, 
it must be pointed out that small group reforms that already have been 
implemented in several states will limit the impact of implementing 
reforms on a national level. 
I have tried to make this paper as detailed as possible, but the com-
plexity of small employer market reforms contained in H.R. 3626 and 
other proposals have exceeded the available data. In response, I have 
concentrated on those areas that will have the greatest impact on the 
small employer market, highlighting those factors and effects that will 
be of greatest concern to policymakers, small employers, insurers, and 
the small employer population. 
Findings from this actuarial study and their implications are pre-
sented in detail in the next five sections. Section 2 gives an overview 
of the results of this paper. Section 3 describes the redistribution of 
small employer premiums as a result of H.R. 3626 rating restrictions. 
Section 4 details the changes in the insured and uninsured small em-
ployer populations and the effect these population changes will have 
on small employer premiums. The impact on rates of standardized 
benefits is described in Section 5. Section 6 covers the impact of cost 
containment provisions. Section 7 deals with the provisions that can-
represents the majority of the nation's commercial insurance companies. HlAA's ac-
tivities range broadly from education to legislative analysis to collecting and dissemi-
nating data and information. 
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not be quantified; it also gives suggestions for areas of further study. 
Section 8 contains the summary and conclusions. Appendix A contains 
a summary of the basic provisions of H.R. 3626. Appendix B contains a 
summary of the provisions of H.R. 3626 that affect rating. Appendix C 
describes the assumptions of the actuarial model under optimistic, best 
estimate, and pessimistic scenarios; and gives a quantitative evaluation 
(based on my best estimate) of H.R. 3626's impact on small employers. 
2 Overview of the Impact of H.R. 3626 
If enacted, H.R. 3626 will make significant changes to the small em-
ployer (two to 50 employees) market for health insurance.4 In particu-
lar, it will: 
• Guarantee that every small employer will have access to coverage; 
• Guarantee that all employees (working at least 17.5 hours a week 
for a small employer with a health insurance plan) and their de-
pendents will be eligible to participate in the employer-provided 
plan; and 
• Make health insurance more affordable for higher risk small em-
ployers (thereby providing coverage to more high risk uninsureds). 
But it also will 
• Make health insurance less affordable for the majority of small 
employers (more than three-quarters of small employers will re-
ceive rate increases of 10 percent or more; see Table 1). For ex-
ample, Table 1 shows that 19 percent of employees will receive a 
rate increase of more than 35 percent, 13 percent will retain their 
coverage, and 6 percent will choose to drop their coverage; 
• Increase the small employer average premium per employee 8 to 
24 percent, on average, adding an estimated three to nine billion 
dollars to small employer costs.s This increase in the average pre-
mium is in addition to the rate increases most small employers will 
receive as a result of rating restrictions. Some small employers, 
however, will receive decreases in rates; and . 
4This study only addresses the impact of H.R. 3626 on the small employer market, 
but H.R. 3626 also sets forth portability requirements that apply to all group health 
plans. 
SMy best estimate is that premiums will rise 12.3 percent, adding $5.6 billion to 
small employer costs. 
Hammond: H.R. 3626, Health Insurance Reform 
Table 1 
Distribution of Rate Changes for Currently Insured 
Small Employers (two to 25 Employees) and the Per-
centage of Employees Keeping or Dropping Coverage 
Under H.R. 3626 
Percentage Rate Change* Keep Drop Total 
More than 35% 13% 6% 19% 
19% to 35% 23% 3% 26% 
7% to 19% 33% 1% 34% 
-10% to 7% 13% 0% 13% 
Less than -10% 8% 0% 8% 
Source: Health Insurance Association of America. 
*Includes 12.3 percent (best estimate) increase in market average rate. 
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• Increase the total number of uninsureds 2 to 5 percent, adding an 
estimated one to two million persons to the total uninsured.6 This 
occurs in spite of the one to two million uninsureds who rejoin the 
market. These new additions are offset by the one to four million 
(mostly low risk) employers and employees who leave the market. 
In addition, the tendency will be for these new uninsureds to be 
younger, to have lower incomes, and to work for the smallest of 
the small employers. Many will be children. 
The percentage of employers receiving rate increases and the mag-
nitude of those increases are related directly to the degree of rate com-
pression created by rating restrictions. Consequently, the nearly flat 
community rating of H.R. 3626 leads to more and greater rate increases 
for employers than might other, less restrictive proposals. 
Furthermore, these rate increases are in addition to trend increases 
and are a direct result of the combination of the access, rating, and 
benefit provisions of H.R. 3626. (See Table Al in Appendix A for a 
summary of these prOvisions.) H.R. 3626 also will lead to significant 
changes in who will be insured in the small employer market. Some of 
these changes are described briefly below . 
• Rating Restrictions: Under H.R. 3626 rating restrictions, the pre-
mium increase experienced by individual small employers will 
vary widely. Rating restrictions will increase rates significantly 
6My best estimate is that the total number of uninsureds will increase 3.4 percent, 
adding an estimated 1.3 million persons to the total uninsured. 
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for two-thirds of the currently insured small employers and their 
employees. Lower income employers and younger employees will 
be forced to subsidize higher income employers and older em-
ployees. Premiums no longer will reflect expected claims, except 
in the aggregate. 
Rating restrictions also lead to a larger percentage rate increase 
for the smaller small employers than for the larger small employ-
ers. This probably reflects two factors: the greater likelihood of 
the smaller small employers purchasing coverage only if they have 
a lower than average risk (and, therefore, premium) and the im-
pact of insurer underwriting. 
• Changes in the Insured, Small Employer Population: The com-
bined results of the H.R. 3626 rating, access, and benefit provi-
sions will be to make health insurance more affordable and acces-
sible for higher risk groups and less affordable for average and 
lower risk groups. This will lead to adverse selection, Le., persons 
who have higher than average health care costs will tend to pur-
chase insurance and those who have lower than average costs will 
tend not to do so. 
Lower risk employers who don't want to drop their coverage also 
may switch to other forms of coverage that now may be less costly 
(as a result of H.R. 3626) than group insurance. In addition, the 
tight rating bands of H.R. 3626 will result in more adverse selec-
tion than proposals with less severe rating bands. Thus, H.R. 3626 
leads to greater changes in the insured, small employer popula-
tion than other proposals might. Altogether, H.R. 3626 leads to 
an 8 to 24 percent average increase in the average premium for 
small employers and to fewer small employers and their employ-
ees being insured . 
• Standardized Benefits: H.R. 3626 standardizes benefits for small 
employer plans by preempting state mandates and promulgating a 
standard benefit package. The standard benefit package is similar 
to Parts A and B of Medicare, but it also includes certain preventive 
services with first dollar coverage.? 
H.R. 3626 increases the self-employment deduction for health in-
surance and adds four portability provisions that will apply to 
all group health plans, regardless of size, including self-insured 
7 First dollar coverage refers to crwerages with no deductible or coinsurance paid by 
the insured. All charges are fully covered by the insurer. 
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plans. The portability requirements are: (i) an excise tax (25 per-
cent of gross premium for the plan) for failure to provide all of 
these portability benefits; (ii) a prohibition against denying, limit-
ing, or conditioning coverage (or benefits) on health status; (iii) a 
maximum six month preexisting condition limitation (except for 
newborns); and (iv) a continuity of coverage provision that man-
dates credit for prior coverage if no more than a three month break 
in coverage has occurred. 
The combination of these benefits is expected to increase pre-
miums about 4 to 5 percent overall for small employers because 
these benefits, in aggregate, are more generous than the average 
plan of benefits that small employers currently offer . 
• Cost Containment Provisions: H.R. 3626 calls for the establish-
ment of a national health care cost containment commission soon 
after the bill's enactment. It also requires the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services to develop optional, maximum payment rates 
for hospitals, physicians, and other health services by October 
1, 1994 and annually thereafter. The rates are to be based on 
DRG (diagnosis-related group) and RBRVS (resource-based rela-
tive value scale) methodologies similar to what Medicare currently 
uses. 
These cost containment provisions are too nebulous to justify any 
estimated reduction in costs at this time. While some studies have 
estimated significant savings from using current Medicare reim-
bursement maximums, it is by no means certain that the payment 
rates eventually approved will be so low. To the extent that the 
optional DRG and RBRVS rates are used uniformly by health care 
payors, including government, however, some reductions in cost 
shifting may occur. 
Thus, although H.R. 3626 will improve the availability of coverage 
for small employers and portability of coverage for all employees, the 
severe rating restrictions in a voluntary market (without mandated uni-
versal coverage) will lead to more persons being uninsured than at 
present. It will force many small employers to pay a high price to make 
coverage more affordable for a few small employers. In short, its costs 
will far exceed its benefits. 
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3 Rating Restrictions 
3.1 The Redistribution of Small Employer Premiums 
Most of the provisions in H.R. 3626 that will have a direct impact 
upon rating are summarized in Appendix B. H.R. 3626 calls for commu-
nity rating of all small employer (two to 50 employees) health insurance 
plans with only a ±25 percent adjustment in rates for age and gender 
if applied consistently to all small employers. 
The redistributional effects (or first order effects as they sometimes 
are called) are the effects of applying the H.R. 3626 rating restrictions 
to premiums for currently insured employers before any changes occur 
in the insured population. That is, before anyone migrates to or from 
(enters or leaves) the small employer market. 
Rating restrictions limit the range of premiums that insurers can 
charge small employers. They redistribute premium rates charged to 
employers about the average (mean) rate, but the mean rate remains 
unchanged. As a result, premiums will increase for some employers 
and decrease for others. 
In the discussion of the redistributional effects of H.R. 3626's rating 
restrictions, the following must be kept in mind: 
1. The insured population is held constant when examining the ef-
fect of H.R. 3626 rating restrictions on currently insured, small 
employer groups; 
2. The redistributional effects do not include the effects of changes 
in the insured and uninsured small employer population. The 
changes in the insured and uninsured small employer population 
are in addition to the redistributional effects described in this 
section; 
3. The aggregate premium generated from all small employer groups 
is assumed to be the same before and after rating restrictions are 
applied. Thus, the average premium is not changed by the effects 
of H.R. 3626. 
4. The change in small employer premium due to redistributional 
effects is the premium the employer pays after rating restrictions 
less the premium it paid before rating restrictions. The after pre-
mium must not include any increases due to the trend increase 
employers will receive at renewal or any other increases resulting 
from H.R. 3626. 
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5. By definition, there is no redistributional effect on the uninsured 
because it is a first order effect, i.e., before migration. 
3.2 Methodology 
The estimates given in this section are derived from an analysis of 
a representative sample of actual small employer group data from five 
different HIAA member companies. Data are collected for similar fee-
for-service, indemnity benefit plans (similar to a $200 deductible, 80 
percent coinsurance plan), a representative mix of employers for each 
insurer, and a representative mix by age/sex, industry, area, size, and 
other small group rating factors for each insurer. 
The data are normalized for each insurer before being run through 
an actuarial model that recalculates the premium each insurer charges 
each of the 3,750 small employers in the sample using the H.R. 3626 
rating restrictions. Geographic factors also are normalized for each in-
surer, but otherwise are unaffected across insurers. The total premium 
for each insurer is not changed, but the premium for each employer 
group is restricted to the H.R. 3626 rating bands such that some em-
ployers receive increases and others receive decreases. 
The insurers chosen for this study represent five insurers with sig-
nificant sales in the commercial, small employer, group health insur-
ance market. This group includes insurers with broad and tight under-
writing practices. While aggregated estimates are provided, there are 
large variations between insurers. This suggests that the effect of rate 
limits will vary greatly from one insurer to another. Further, while an 
effort is made to obtain data from a group of carriers that will be fairly 
representative of the small employer group market, there is no way to 
determine accurately how representative these carriers are. Therefore, 
the estimates should not be considered industry estimates but should 
be considered as the composite experience of five insurers. 
Representative databases of groups with two to nine employees and 
ten to 25 employees are obtained from each of the five insurance com-
panies. The two to nine and ten to 25 data are analyzed separately 
and then combined. The results for groups with two to nine employees 
are in the same direction but more pronounced than the results for the 
combined market (Le., groups with two to 25 employees). Results are 
somewhat less pronounced for groups with ten to 25 employees. 
The database includes employer groups with two to 25 employees 
rather than groups with two to 50 employees (the definition of a small 
employer in H.R. 3626). But comparing the effect ofH.R. 3626 on groups 
with two to nine employees versus its effect on groups with ten to 25 
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employees indicates that H.R. 3626 has relatively less impact on the ten 
to 25 employee groups. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
effect of H.R. 3626 on groups with 26 to 50 employees will be even less. 
Hence, groups with two to 25 can serve effectively as proxies for the two 
to 50 employee groups without significantly affecting the conclusions 
of this study. 
3.3 Impact on Small Employers 
Even though the overall average premium remains unchanged, the 
premium per capita8 for almost every employer group either will in-
crease or decrease as a result of H.R. 3626. Therefore, the distribution 
of rates will change. The change in the distribution of premium rates 
for insured employer groups before rating restrictions, and before mi-
gration and expanded benefits, is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 
1 shows the distribution of premium rates for insured employer groups 
before rating restrictions, and before migration and expanded benefits 
(Le., before H.R. 3626) as a percentage of the mean rate, while Figure 2 
shows the distribution after H.R. 3626 rating restrictions are applied. 
The impact of the H.R. 3626 rating restrictions on individual small 
employer groups is examined by determining the premium increase (or 
decrease) each employer will receive under H.R. 3626's rating restric-
tions. The employers are grouped into five categories based on the level 
of the employer's percentage change from its current premiums. Then 
the subSidy provided by low average age employers to high average 
age employers is examined. Last, the subsidy provided by the smallest 
small employers to larger small employers and the price sensitivity of 
the smallest small employers are examined. 
Rating restrictions will affect each small employer differently. H.R. 
3626 restricts small employer rates to a narrow band, forcing all but a 
handful of employers to receive premium increases or decreases. These 
first order effects on the total premium for each small employer in 
the sample are illustrated in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Table 2, for example, 
shows that 19 percent of employers with two to 25 employees will have 
an increase in premium of more than 20 percent from H.R. 3626 rating 
restrictions alone. For this 19 percent of employers, however, increases 
will range from 21 percent to 238 percent, and the average increase for 
all employers receiving more than a 20 percent increase will be 36.6 
percent. More than two-thirds of all employer groups (68 percent) will 
BThe premium per capita is the total premium for the employer group divided by 
the total number of employees and dependents covered by the employer. 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of Premium Rates of Currently Insured Employers 
Before Rating Restrictions, Migration and Expanded Benefits 
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receive premium increases from rating restrictions. Nearly half of all 
employer groups (45 percent) will receive premium increases greater 
than 5 percent. 
Table 2 
Distribution of Rate Changes for Currently Insured 
Small Employers (two to 25 Employees) Under H.R. 
3626 Before Migration and Expanded Benefits 
Percentage Rate Change 
More than 20% 
6% to 20% 
-6% to 6% 
-20% to -6% 
Less than -20% 






Source: Health Insurance Association of America. 
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Figure 2 
Distribution of Premium Rates of Currently Insured Employers 
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To examine the extent to which low average age employers subsi-
dize high average age employers, increases in premiums for the one-
fifth (the fifth quintile) of employers with the lowest average employee 
age are compared to the increases in premiums for all small employ-
ers. If the percentage of employers receiving a premium increase is 
similar in each premium-increase category, it indicates that little or no 
extra subsidy is demanded from the employers with a younger group 
of employees. The results, howev~r, show that considerably more low 
average age employers will receive premium increases than will all em-
ployers. Compared to the 68 percent of employers receiving premium 
increases among all employers, 82 percent of low average age employ-
ers are expected to receive premium increases. 
Table 3 shows that, in contrast to the 19 percent of employers that 
will receive a premium increase of more than 20 percent, 30 percent 
of low average age employers will receive premium increases of this 
magnitude. Additionally, only 10 percent of low average age employers 
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will receive a significant premium decrease versus 21 percent of all 
employers. 
Table 3 
Distribution of Rate Changes for the Youngest 
Quintile of Small Employers (two to 25 Em-
ployees) Under H.R. 3626 Before Migration 
and Expanded Benefits 
Percentage Rate Change 
More than 20% 
6% to 20% 
-6% to 6% 
-20% to -6% 
Less than -20% 






Source: Health Insurance Association of America. 
While the direction of this result is not surprising, its magnitude is 
significant and indicates the extent to which H.R. 3626 shifts rates from 
the actuarial goal of consistency between premiums and risk assumed 
(Le., premiums no longer reasonably reflect expected claims, except in 
the aggregate). Also, because of the clear relationship between higher 
ages and higher incomes, this has the perverse effect of forCing lower 
income employees to subsidize higher income employees. Thus, the 
redistributional effect of H.R. 3626 is regressive. 
To examine the extent to which the smallest of the small employ-
ers will subsidize larger small employers, increases in premiums for the 
largest size quintile of employers insured by each carrier (generally, em-
ployers with more than 15 employees) are compared to the increases in 
premiums for all small employers. Again, if the percentage of employ-
ers receiving a premium increase is similar in each premium increase 
category, it indicates that little or no extra subSidy exists. The results 
of this model, however, indicate that considerably fewer of the larger 
small employers will receive premium increases when compared to all 
small employers. Compared to the 68 percent of all employers that will 
receive increases (increases ranging up to 238 percent), only 59 percent 
of larger small employers will receive increases (increases ranging only 
as high as 131 percent). 
Table 4 shows that 12 percent of these larger small employers (ver-
sus 19 percent of all employers) will receive a premium increase of more 
than 20 percent. Likewise, in contrast to the overall statistic that 32 per-
cent of small employers will receive a premium decrease, 41 percent of 
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the larger small employers will receive a decrease. That is, larger small 
employers are almost one-third more likely to receive decreases than 
the smallest of the small employers. 
Table 4 
Distribution of Rate Changes for the Largest 
Quintile of Small Employers (two to 25 Em-
ployees) Under H.R. 3626 Before Migration 
and Expanded Benefits 
Percentage Rate Change 
More than 20% 
6% to 20% 
-6% to 6% 
-20% to -6% 
Less than -20% 






Source: Health Insurance Association of America. 
There are several ways that Table 4 can be interpreted. The most 
simplistic way is that the smallest employers pay less because carriers 
underwrite the smallest employers more aggressively and select better 
risks, on average. If this is true, the fifth quintile of small employers 
will have the greatest increases. Upon reviewing the data on the fifth 
quintile of small employers and comparing it to all small employers, 
however, the results are ambiguous. 
Alternatively, Table 4 can be interpreted as an illustration of the 
greater price sensitivity of the smallest of the small employers. Be-
cause the larger small employers have about the same percentage of 
premium decreases as all small employers, those larger small employ-
ers seem as willing as all small employers to pay the increases when 
premiums rise. But a smaller percentage of larger small employers 
receive premium increases than all small employers. As a result, the 
smallest small employers appear to be either less willing or unable to 
purchase coverage unless they have a lower than average risk and, as a 
consequence, receive a lower than average premium. This indicates the 
greater price sensitivity of the smallest small employers. 
It is probably most reasonable to interpret Table 4 as demonstrating 
the combined result of underwriting decisions by carriers and the price 
sensitivity of the smallest small employers. 
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3.4 Impact on Insurers 
All insurers are not affected equally under H.R. 3626. The impact of 
the H.R. 3626 rating restrictions on insurers varies depending on the 
mix of high and low cost insureds that the insurer underwrites. For 
example, in contrast to the 19 percent of employers that will receive a 
premium increase of more than 20 percent, one insurer in the sample 
will have 37 percent of employers with increases that large. 
The rating restrictions in H.R. 3626 break the actuarial link between 
the premiums insurers charge and the risks they assume. Thus, pre-
miums no longer will reflect the expected claims the insurer will incur 
for each class of risk. Solvency and actuarial soundness of rates will be 
affected any time reforms lead to an environment where it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to charge rates that reasonably reflect the expected 
costs the insurer will incur for each class of risk. Therefore, the reforms 
in this bill could place additional financial stress on insurers and could 
lead to their financial insolvency. 
Insurer rate bands will be based on the insurer's own average rate. 
Some insurers will have lower average rates and some will have higher 
average rates. Insurers that, coincidentally or because of underwriting 
before reform, have insured populations with lower than average risk 
can be expected to have a lower average (or community) rate. Other in-
surers could insure a population that has a greater proportion of higher 
than average risks; their community rate is likely to be higher than the 
community rate of insurers with lower than average risks. Insurers may 
be able to absorb some losses for a period of time, but continued dete-
rioration will force them out of the small group business. In addition, 
other lines may subsidize these losses. 
Insurers that have the majority of their business in the small group 
market may not fare as well as insurers with a more diversified mix of 
business. Insurers that are only in the health business may not have 
the option of retaining losses until they can leave the market gracefully. 
Unrecoverable losses could force them into insolvency, further disrupt-
ing the market and threatening coverage for their existing policyhold-
ers. Furthermore, this will be particularly disruptive to policyholders 
in managed care networks and to provider-patient relationships. 
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4 Changes in Insured/Uninsured Small Employers 
4.1 Migration Effects on Small Employers Populations 
In this section, the migration effects (also called the second order 
effects) of H.R. 3626's rating restrictions, access provisions,9 and stan-
dardized benefits are examined. The migration effects are the effects 
of employers and employees entering and leaving the small employer 
group market as a direct result of the change in access rules and changes 
in premiums. 
The rating restrictions (described in Section 3) lirmt the premium 
rate that insurers can charge high risk employers, making coverage 
more affordable for high cost risks. At the same time, access provi-
sions guarantee employers and employees the right to purchase cov-
erage. This combination encourages insured high risk employers and 
employees to retain their insurance coverage. The access provisions 
also encourage uninsured high risk employers and employees to pur-
chase insurance coverage. Guaranteed eligibility provisions assure that 
all employees (working at least 17.5 hours a week for a small employer 
with a health insurance plan) and their dependents will be eligible to 
participate in their employer's plan. Guaranteed renewability provi-
sions ensure that once an employer gets coverage, the employer will 
not lose it. 
In addition, H.R. 3626 increases the self-employed deduction for 
health insurance benefits, and self-insurance10 is limited. The effects of 
the self-employed deduction and, to a lesser extent, the self-insurance 
provision lead to changes in the insured small employer population. 
The expanded benefits also increase premiums for small employers, 
thus exacerbating population changes. 
In the absence of rating restrictions, H.R. 3626's access provisions 
will lead to some changes in who is insured. These prOvisions also will 
lead to either higher rates for the groups affected, to increases in the in-
surers' average rate for all small employers, or to a combination of both. 
When combined with the severe rate compression of the nearly flat com-
munity rating and the expanded benefits, however, access provisions 
will increase rates significantly. These increases either (i) add to the 
increases the majority of small employer groups receive; (ii) make the 
9The H.R. 3626 access provisions also are summarized in Appendix B. The most 
significant access reforms are guaranteed issue, guaranteed eligibility (whole group), 
and guaranteed renewability. 
tOH.R. 3626 limits the efficacy of self-insurance, but it does not prohibit it. Conse-
quently, small employers for whom it is still advantageous to self-insure (even with the 
2S percent excise tax) may choose to do so. 
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employers that receive small decreases instead receive rate increases; or 
(iii) reduce the rate decreases that employers receiving larger decreases 
will receive. 
In the following discussion of the migration effects of H.R. 3626's 
rating restrictions, the following should be kept in mind: 
1. In this section, the insured population is changing. Also, there is 
no mandate on the employer to provide, or on the employee to 
obtain, coverage, Le., it is a voluntarv market; 
2. The effects of migration are examined using sensitivity tests on 
a range of assumptions regarding how many insureds enter and 
leave the market and the morbidity (net claim costs) of these mi-
grants; 
3. Because carriers are insuring a different population, the average 
premium of each employer group and the aggregate premium over 
all groups combined may change; 
4. The difference in premium for all small employers is determined 
by comparing the market average of premiums before reforms to 
the market average of premiums after reforms. This difference is 
in addition to the trend increase employers may receive in their 
premiums and to the redistributional effects; 
5. Migration effects also have an impact on the number of uninsured 
small employers. 
4.2 Methodology 
The estimates in this section are derived from sensitivity analysis us-
ing the actuarial migration model described in Appendix C. The model 
is a reasonable compromise between simplicity and complexity. It iden-
tifies those factors that need to be measured to understand the impli-
cations of small group reforms. In addition, the model shows which 
of the factors have the greatest impact on premium changes as a re-
sult of reforms. The model splits the small employer health insurance 
market into three blocks: (i) employer-provided insurance (including 
self-insured employers); (ii) insurance from any other source; and (iii) 
the uninsured. 
The model addresses the movement of small employers into and out 
of the health insurance market, but it does not attempt to simulate the 
effect of employers moving between carriers within the market. While 
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movement within the market may lower a particular employer's pre-
mium, it will not change total costs in the market unless employers 
reduce their coverage at the same time. In the long run, any premium 
shortfalls from insufficient rates will show up as future trend rate in-
creases. 
Starting with the small employer population and the morbidity pat-
tern of each block before reforms, the population and morbidity of 
insured small employers entering and leaving each of these blocks is 
combined algebraically in the migration model in order to estimate the 
small employer population and the morbidity pattern in each block af-
ter reforms. 
The uninsured are segmented further into high and low risk individ-
uals. Varying assumptions are used for how many individuals enter the 
insured market from these two segments, as high risk individuals and 
their employers have a greater incentive to enter the market and have 
a greater impact on the increase in premiums as a result of H.R. 3626. 
These assumptions are discussed in greater detail in Sections 4.6 and 
4.7. 
While population-based data are not consistent with developing ex-
act numerical estimates, reasonable ranges can be developed for the 
model's assumptions. (See Appendix C.) Consequently, it is necessary 
to perform sensitivity tests on the results using different sets of as-
sumptions, or scenarios, in order to test the full range of possible val-
ues for each variable. For purposes of illustration, these are narrowed 
to three scenarios that bound the full range of outcomes: low cost, 
most likely, and high cost. The results vary over a wide range and are 
sensitive to some of the assumptions. 
4.3 Impact on Premium per Capita 
Migration effects will increase the premium per capita for all small 
employer groups covered by an insurer equally. The premium per 
capita for every employer group will increase above what it would have 
been due to rating restrictions only. Employers scheduled to receive 
rate increases will get higher increases. Employers due to receive rate 
decreases will receive smaller decreases or no decreases. The distribu-
tion of premiums per capita for insured employer groups will change 
to reflect the migration effects as well as redistributional effects. 
The distribution of premiums per capita for currently insured em-
ployer groups after migration will be similar to the distribution in Figure 
2 except the average premium (the 100 percent level) will be higher, i.e., 
Figure 2 shifts to the right for currently insured employers. 
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4.4 Impact on Small Employers 
H.R. 3626's access provisions, in conjunction with rating and benefit 
provisions, will lead to population changes that will cause the average 
premium per capita to rise for all small employers. This increase could 
range from 8 to 24 percent of current premiums. This range is broad 
because the estimated results are sensitive to critical assumptions that 
are used in the migration model. The upper and lower ends of the 
range can be considered extremes such that the most likely outcome 
falls somewhere close to the middle of the range. 
The premium increase from migration will be in addition to any in-
crease or decrease that employers will receive from redistributing pre-
miums to meet rating restrictions. For example, if a carrier has to raise 
the average premium 12 percent for second order effects, any group 
that previously received a 24 percent increase now will receive a 39 
percent increase. (The impact on rates is cumulative, e.g., 1.24 x 1.12 = 
1.3888, which is roughly a 39 percent increase.) Likewise, any group 
that had received a 24 percent decrease from rate compression now 
will receive only a 15 percent decrease (0.76 x 1.12 = 0.8512), effec-
tively wiping out almost half of the benefit of the rating restrictions. 
While it is possible to envision better or worse scenarios, it seems 
most likely that employers will experience premium changes from -25 
percent to +271 percent at renewal when the effects of trend and H.R. 
3626 are combined (assuming an 18 percent trend factor). Thus, the 
covariant effects of community rating in conjunction with guaranteed 
access and expanded benefits effectively could undermine the goals of 
greater access, affordability, and coverage in a voluntary market. 
Some employers may respond to the rate increases caused by H.R. 
3626 by dropping their coverage. Historically, however, employers re-
ceiving large trend or experience increases have not responded by drop-
ping their coverage. Instead they try to retain their coverage by seeking 
less costly alternatives such as reducing plan benefits or increasing em-
ployee contributions. Failing that, they may seek coverage through the 
individual health insurance or self-insurance markets to the extent that 
these markets provide cheaper alternatives after H.R. 3626 reforms. 
Employees experiencing large rate increases also will seek lower cost 
options. Some employees may choose to reduce their health insurance 
premium by dropping family coverage in favor of single coverage on 
the employee only or by increasing their deductibles and copayments. 
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4.5 Impact on Insurers 
The H.R. 3626 rating, access, and benefit provisions will make health 
insurance more affordable and accessible for high risk groups and less 
affordable for low risk employers. This will increase adverse selection, 
i.e., persons who know that they have higher than average health care 
costs will increase their purchase coverage while those who know that 
they have lower than average costs will reduce their coverage. The tight 
rating bands of H.R. 3626 cause more adverse selection than other pro-
posals with less severe rating bands. Thus, H.R. 3626 leads to greater 
adverse selection and greater changes in the insured, small employer 
population than other proposals to date. 
Because low risk insureds tend to shop for coverage (replace their 
current coverage for lower cost coverage) more than high risk insureds, 
insurers with lower average rates can be expected to attract more low 
cost risks than those with higher average rates. This implies that, for 
competitive/antis election reasons, some companies will not be able to 
raise their rates high enough to cover expected claim costs. If their 
in-force business eventually deteriorates to the point that it contains a 
significantly disproportionate share of high cost insureds, the insurer 
will be left with two equally poor choices: reduce rates (and hope that 
the low cost risks will come) or raise rates and experience further dete-
rioration of their claims experience. 
Alternatively, those insurers experiencing enrollment losses as a re-
sult of employers dropping coverage (especially low risk ones) could 
be forced to (i) strengthen and apply participation requirements more 
strictly; (ii) expand self-insurance products for small employers; or (iii) 
seek reinsurers/partners in order to spread the risk and maintain mar-
ket share. The impact on insurers of current migrations of both large 
and small employers toward self-insured, ERISA-protected plansll pro-
vides strong empirical evidence of this tendency. 
Insurers will be subject to the effects of adverse selection (even from 
employers that maintain their coverage) if employees who will have to 
contribute toward higher premiums choose to forego coverage instead. 
The insurer still may cover the employer, but now fewer employees and 
their dependents will be in the risk pool. It also can be presumed that 
employees foregoing coverage will be, as a group, lower risk than those 
remaining insured. 
Insurers that guarantee issue coverage to a disproportionate share 
of high risk insureds will face an additional risk: their small group busi-
11 ERISA plans are self-insured medical plans established by the United States 
Congress in accordance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 
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ness will have a higher percentage of high cost claimants than their rates 
anticipated. At the same time, rates only can be set within the allowable 
rate bands, and rate increases are limited. It may become impossible to 
offer an actuarially sound, competitive rate that attracts a reasonable 
mix of high and low risk insureds to assure the integrity of the risk 
pool. Insurers could find their total premium (from all small groups) 
insufficient to pay their claims. This increases insurer uncertainty that 
premiums will be sufficient to pay claims. 
Risk margins in current rates are based upon the level of uncertainty 
(the probability that actual costs will vary from expected costs) that 
exists in the current market. The increased uncertainty of the market 
after reforms will encourage insurers to increase their risk margins. 
The magnitude of the increase will depend on each insurer's specific 
situation, and it is unlikely that any a priori estimate of its magnitude 
will be credible. 
4.6 Impact on the Uninsured 
Estimating the number of un insureds attached to the small employer 
market is hindered by having to determine whether an establishment is 
a small employer or part of a larger firm. For example, six dry cleaners 
each with ten employees may be part of the same 60 employee firm or 
they may be six separate ten employee firms-in both cases they will 
be six establishments. The question of what to do about dependents 
when both spouses work and both are uninsured, but one works for 
a small firm and the other works for a large firm is also problematic. 
Also, the data are not always split into the employer size categories 
desired for analysis. In spite of these complications, algorithms have 
been developed that address these issues. Estimates of the number of 
small employer uninsured range from 11 to 15 million. 
Even in the best scenario, indications are that the number of small 
group uninsureds will increase rather than decrease under H.R. 3626, 
contrary to the desired goal of this bill. As many as 0.6 million to 2.3 
million Americans may reenter the market under H.R. 3626 reforms. 
An estimated 1.2 million to 4.1 million more Americans may drop or 
lose their coverage. The net effect will be an increase in the number of 
uninsureds of 0.7 million to 1.9 million, increasing the number of small 
group uninsureds 6 to 12 percent. Because small group uninsureds are 
about half of the uninsured, however, H.R. 3626 will increase the total 
number of uninsureds about 3 to 6 percent. If previous socioeconomic 
patterns hold for these new uninsureds, the tendency will be for these 
new uninsureds to be younger, lower income, and from the smallest 
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employers. Many also will be children. 
Certain assumptions related to the uninsured have a profound im-
pact on the results of this study, so a short discussion of these as-
sumptions is presented below. The migration model assumptions used 
in each of the three scenarios are shown in Appendix C. 
4.7 Number of High Risk Uninsureds 
A key assumption is the number of high risk uninsured employees. 
High risk uninsureds are medically uninsurable individuals who may be 
denied health insurance under current medical underwriting practices. 
Prior to a recent AHCPR (Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, 
United States Department of Health and Human Services) study, reason-
able estimates for this variable ranged from 7 to 12 percent. The AHCPR 
study shows that only 36.8 percent of the uninsured have investigated 
the cost of private health insurance; only 2.5 percent of that cohort 
have ever been denied coverage or had their coverage limited. The 2.5 
percent includes more than just medically uninsurable individuals and 
includes those who have been excluded from individual (not just group) 
coverage. It also includes those who ever have been rejected for a pol-
icy, whether they will be today or not. It does present an upper bound 
for who may be medically uninsurable among the 36.8 percent who 
have investigated coverage. Assuming the same proportion of uninsur-
able persons among those who haven't investigated coverage as among 
those who have (a grossly conservative assumption), 6.8 percent of the 
uninsured at most could be medically uninsurable. 
Medically uninsurable individuals may not be distributed uniformly 
among the various segments of the uninsured population. For example, 
small employers could have a higher percentage of medically uninsur-
able employees than large employers. In case there is a disproportion-
ate share of these high cost insureds among small group uninsureds, 
7 percent is assumed to be the t'ow end of the range for small group 
uninsureds. Even with the possibility of a biased distribution, however, 
it appears that the 12 percent estimate for the top of the range for this 
assumption is too conservative. But the 7 to 12 percent range used in 
this study encompasses the most reasonable range of values available 
from current research. 
4.8 The Morbidity of Medically Uninsurable Employees 
Current studies show that the morbidity of medically uninsurable 
employees range anywhere from 200 percent of the net claim cost of 
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the current small employer group market to as much as 500 percent. 
Analysis of the experience of individual high risk pools, however, shows 
that even when considered as individuals rather than as groups, the 
experience for these high cost insureds only averages 350 percent of 
the current small employer group market experience. Because groups 
can be expected to have employees and dependents that are standard 
or better risks to offset the additional claim cost of high cost insureds, 
it is expected that, on average, the morbidity of high risk groups will 
be less than the morbidity of individual high risk pools. For this study 
a range of 248 to 300 percent of current small employer net claim cost 
is used for this variable. 
5 Standardized Benefits and Deductions 
H.R. 3626 mandates a generous preexisting condition limitation, the 
preemption of state mandates, the addition of preventive services with 
first dollar coverage, and a standard benefit package similar to Parts 
A and B of Medicare. In an attempt to place the self-employed on par-
ity with all other employers, H.R. 3626 increases the self-employed de-
duction for health care expenses to 100 percent of expenses. These 
provisions are described in Appendix B. 
The standardized benefits detailed below are expected to increase 
small employer premiums about 4 to 5 percent overall because these 
benefits are more generous in aggregate than the average plan of bene-
fits small groups currently offer. The impact of the deductions is harder 
to quantify. The following is a description of the standardized benefits 
and deductions . 
• Preexisting Condition limitation: Based on data from HIAA's em-
ployer survey and HIAA calculations using the 1994 Tillinghast 
Group Medical Insurance Rate Manual,12 it is estimated that re-
ducing the preexisting condition limitation period to a required 
maximum of six months will add about 2 percent to an average 
policy. 
• Standard Benefit Package, Including Preventative Services: The 
standard benefits package (except for some of the preventive ben-
efits) will be less than a standard employer provided plan in some 
12The 1994 Tillinghast Group Medical Insurance Rate Manual is published by Tilling-
hast, 101 South Hanley Street, St. Louis MO 63105-3411, USA. 
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states, while in other states the H.R. 3626 plan will be more gen-
erous. The net effect is estimated to be about a 1 percent increase 
in the avprage premium from current levels . 
• Elimination of State Mandates: The effect of eliminating state 
mandated benefits and policy provisions is included in the pric-
ing of the standard benefit package. The reduction for eliminating 
state mandates is not readily apparent because H.R. 3626 man-
dates a package of benefits that, with the exceptions above, is 
similar to the average small employer plan. Furthermore, for a 
small employer that offers its employees a plan with fewer ben-
efits than the H.R. 3626 minimums, rate increases will be even 
higher than this analysis otherwise indicates. 
• Self-Employed Deduction: It is difficult to estimate the impact of 
the self-employed deduction provision. Though the self-employed 
population is small compared to the total population, it is rea-
sonable to assume some increase. For example, increasing this 
deduction will tend to encourage the self-employed with above 
average costs to seek insurance more than it may encourage the 
self-employed with below average costs to seek insurance. This 
is evident in the results of the 1987 national medical expenditure 
survey13 that show individually insured persons have much higher 
cost and risk than group insureds. I estimate that this may add 
another 1 to 2 percent to the average premium. 
6 Cost Containment Provisions 
H.R. 3626 calls for the establishment of a national health care cost 
containment commission shortly after enactment of the bill. It also 
requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 
to establish optional maximum payment rates for hospitals, physicians, 
and other health services by October 1, 1994 and annually thereafter. 
The rates are to be based on DRG and RBRVS methodologies similar to 
those Medicare currently uses. 
This approach to cost containment will not contain health care costs 
effectively because it does nothing to control the fundamental sources 
of health care cost increases other than medical price inflation. 
13The national medical expenditure survey is a detailed survey of the health expen-
ditures of Americans and their families. This survey is sponsored by the US Agency 
for Health Care Policy and Research, Department of Health and Human Services, 200 
Independence Avenue SW, Washington DC 20201. 
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The most important sources of health care cost increases are med-
ical cost inflation, cost shifting, utilization (the number of health care 
services used), adverse selection, defensive medicine, and new tech-
nologies. In 1991 the medical cost inflation component was responsible 
for only about a third of health care cost increases. Thus, an approach 
that addresses only medical cost inflation addresses only) about one-
third of the problem. 
But H.R. 3626 may not control medical cost inflation effectively. 
While some studies have estimated Significant savings from using cur-
rent Medicare reimbursement maximums, it is by no means certain that 
the payment rates eventually approved will be so low. Because the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services will be charged with establishing 
maximum payment rates (without guidelines for how high these rates 
could be), it is not certain that the maximum payment rates set by the 
Secretary will contain costs effectively. 
The only positive point that can be made regarding this approach is 
that, to the extent that the maximum payment rates are used uniformly 
by health care payors (including government payors), some reductions 
in cost shifting may occur. It is reasonable to expect that insurers will 
use these rates if they are legislated or if they are less than what the 
insurer currently pays. Any insurer that does not likely will be at a 
competitive disadvantage. 
The H.R. 3626 cost containment provisions are still too nebulous to 
justify any estimated reduction in costs at this time. 
7 Provisions Not Quantified 
The number and complexity of health insurance market reform pro-
posals have outstripped the available data, and H.R. 3626 is no excep-
tion. Consequently, it is impossible to quantify certain provisions in 
the bill. In some cases more data and analysis are needed. In others 
data are not available to estimate credibly the impact of certain reforms 
on the market. 
Some of the provisions not speCifically quantified in this study are 
the minimum plan period, the notice of renewal, the index rate variation 
between blocks, the types of family enrullment, the transfers among 
blocks, the 5 percent limit on rate increases above trend, the geographic 
factors limited to MSAs,14 the self-insurance prohibition, the uniform 
claims forms, and the uniform reporting standards. 
14As defined by the United States Census Bureau, MSA means a metropolitan statis-
tical area, e.g., Hartford, Connecticut. 
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Although the effect of H.R. 3626 on employees purchasing single 
coverage versus employees purchasing family coverage is not analyzed 
in this study, an independent study by an HIAA member company 
shows H.R. 3626 can be expected to increase rates for single coverage 
more than for family or single parent coverages. (Increases for singles 
are estimated to be five times greater.) 
Some covariant effects cannot be analyzed with the data available 
and are beyond the scope of this study. For example, how geographic 
factors may change in the absence of other risk classification factors 
(such as industry or full age/gender rating) is not examined. As the 
scope of this study is limited to the effects of H.R. 3626 on the small 
employer group health insurance market, the impact of portability re-
quirements on employers other than small employers is not analyzed. 
Similarly, the impact of H.R. 3626 on association groups and employer-
provided individual health insurance is also beyond the scope of this 
study. 
No specific attempt is made in this study to measure H.R. 3626's 
effect on the solvency of employers and insurers. But the magnitude of 
rate increases for some employers and the likelihood that certain insur-
ers will get a disproportionate share of high risk insureds will have an 
impact on their solvency. Also, it is not possible to include the impact 
of state regulations already promulgated. For example, some states 
have passed laws similar to the rating restrictions and other provisions 
in this bill. In these states, to the extent that premiums and the market 
already reflect these changes, H.R. 3626 will have less impact. 
8 Summary and Conclusions 
H.R. 3626 tries to marry the social goals of guaranteed availability, 
community rating, and generous standard benefits. It doesn't consider 
sufficiently the realities of price-sensitive small employers and individ-
ual employees acting in their own best interest in a highly competitive, 
voluntary market. 
While improving availability and affordability of health insurance for 
a minority of small employers, H.R. 3626's rating restrictions increase 
premiums disproportionately for the majority of small employers. Em-
ployers with younger, lower income employees will be forced to sub-
sidize employers with older, higher income employees. Smaller small 
employers will subsidize larger small employers. Premiums no longer 
will reflect expected claims, except in the aggregate, exacerbating the 
tendency in small employer markets to be uninsured due to cost. 
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Changes in the insured small employer population as a result of H.R. 
3626 will increase the average premium per capita of all small employer 
groups 8 to 24 percent, largely as a result of the severe rating restric-
tions. The premium per capita for almost every small employer group 
either will increase or decrease, and the distribution of premiums per 
capita for insured employer groups will change, generally worsening. 
In effect, H.R. 3626 proposes a solution that affects 100 percent of in-
sured small employers, most of them negatively, in order to address a 
problem that afflicts less than 15 percent of small employers. 
Some employers will respond to the H.R. 3626 rate increases by 
dropping their coverage altogether. Based on my experience with sell-
ing coverage to small employers, it seems far more likely that small 
employers who currently have coverage will do what they have always 
done when faced with significant rate increases. They will seek less 
costly alternatives such as reducing benefits to the minimum allowable 
(if their benefits are currently more generous), increasing employee con-
tributions (employee share of the premium), self-insuring (if feasible), 
or utilizing the individual health insurance market. 
While the full impact is not yet clear, the impact of the community 
rating law for small employers in New York State seems consistent with 
this conclusion. Young and healthy lives have dropped out of the sys-
tem, claims costs have risen, and, at least anecdotally, small employers 
and individuals are choosing less generous benefit plans. (New York 
does not mandate a minimum or standard benefit plan.) Mitigating any 
negative impact of reforms in New York State is the implementation of 
a risk adjustment mechanism for risk pooling across the individual and 
small group markets. If H.R. 3626 had contained such a provision, the 
impact on rates and the market would be less. 
Employees experiencing large rate increases also will seek lower cost 
alternatives. Employees could choose to drop their coverage or reduce 
their contribution toward premiums by dropping family coverage in 
favor of single coverage on the employee only. 
H.R. 3626 will increase the risk to insurers of providing small em-
ployer coverage. Coupled with a hostile regulatory environment wherein 
rate increases often are reduced or denied, insurers will find it increas-
ingly difficult to charge premiums that are adequate to protect existing 
policyholders. In response, insurers staying in the market may try to 
strengthen and apply participation requirements more strictly, increase 
risk margins, expand self-insurance products to small employers, re-
duce rates below an actuarially sound level (in an attempt to achieve or 
maintain a standard mix of risks), or develop more innovative responses 
that will protect the insurer from insolvency. 
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In a highly competitive, voluntary insurance market, the actuarial 
process of rating, the underwriting process of risk selection, and the 
competitive market in which they operate are symbiotic. Actuarially 
sound rates are established to ensure the solvency of the insurer in 
order to protect its policyholders. If these rates are too high, some 
persons will not purchase insurance. If rates are too low, there will 
not be sufficient reserves to pay policyholder claims. If the insurer 
screens too many risks, there will not be sufficient policyholders to 
cover the costs of operating the business. If the insurer screens too 
few or does not assign the appropriate rate to high risk policyholders, 
it will not have sufficient reserves to pay policyholder claims. There is 
always a decision to be made regarding costs versus benefits whenever 
considering changes to any of these processes-changing one affects 
all. 
H.R. 3626 fails this litmus test of cost/benefit analysis. It does so, 
in large part, because of its severe rating restrictions. In the current 
market where health care costs are such a large proportion of nonsalary 
employee expenses, employers are looking to reduce this expense and 
are unwilling to subsidize actuarially higher risk insureds of another 
employer. If their employees are actuarially low risk, they demand low 
premiums. Otherwise, they do not purchase insurance. Consequently, 
forcing insurers in a free market to charge premiums that do not reflect 
the expected claims of insureds (thereby forcing large rate increases on 
most small employers) in order to satisfy a social goal will not produce 
the intended result. 
This study shows that it is not the guaranteed issue/availability pro-
visions of H.R. 3626 that lead to most of the small employer premium 
increases; rather it is the bill's rating restrictions. Other small group 
reform proposals with less severe rating restrictions will provide the 
benefits of guaranteed availability without the onerous rate increases 
precipitated by H.R. 3626. 
In clOSing, although H.R. 3626 will improve availability of coverage 
for small employers and portability of coverage for all employees, the 
severe rating restrictions will lead to more persons being uninsured. It 
will force many small employers to pay a high price to make coverage 
more affordable for a few small employers. In short, the costs of this 
bill will far exceed its benefits. 
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Appendix A: H.R. 3626, Summary of Benefit Provi-
sions 
Table Al 
















Two to 50 employees (portability provisions 
apply to all group health plans); 
Various, but up to three years for some 
provisions; 
Guaranteed issue (year round; uniform waiting 
periods and minimum participation require-
ments allowed); 
Not applicable to individual policies (unless 
provided by employer); 
Age, gender, and geography (no smaller than 
MSA);' 
Community rating such that variations between 
plocks of business shall not exceed 20 percent. 
Age and sex adjustments may be used, but only 
up to ±25 percent and only if applied to all 
small employers; 
May not exceed the sum of the percentage 
change in the base premium rate plus 5 per-
centage points; 
• Guaranteed renewable except for nonpayment 
of premiums, fraud or misrepresentation, and 
failure to maintain minimum participation 
rates; 
• Must give notice 60 days prior to renewal 
date; terms of renewal must be same as at 
issue except for premiums and administrative 
changes; 
Coverage must be offered to any eligible 





'MSA ~ Metropolitan statistical area. 
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Table Al (continued) 






These provisions apply to all group health plans: 
• Excise tax for failure to provide all of these 
portability benefits (25 percent of gross pre-
miums); 
• Prohibition against denying, limiting, or con-
ditioning coverage (or benefits) on health 
status; 
• Maximum six month preexisting condition 
limitation (except for newborns); 
• Continuity of coverage provision that man-
dates credit for prior coverage if no more than 
a three month break in coverage; 
• Self-employed deduction increased to 100 per-
cent; 
• Applies to employees working at least 17.5 
hours per week; 
• deductible standard benefit package with pre-. 
ventive benefits; 
• Preemption of state mandates beyond stand-
ard benefit package; 
• percent excise tax on self-insured; 
• Any payor may choose to use DRC" and 
RBRVSt schedules; 
• Must offer single, couple, single parent, and 
family rates 
Various: depends on provision (some on January 
I, 1992). 
"DRG = Diagnosis-related group. 
tRBRVS = Resource-based relative value scale. 
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Appendix B: H.R. 3626, Summary of Provisions Af-
fecting Rating 
H.R. 3626 has provisions that apply to small groups (defined as em-
ployer groups of two to 50 employees) and all employer groups, in-
cluding self-insured plans. An employee is defined as any worker who 
normally works at least 17.5 hours per week. 
Self-employed deduction: The amount of deduction for self-em-
ployed individuals is extended indefinitely, starting in 1993. The 
deduction increases from 25 percent to 50 percent in 1993, 75 
percent in 1994, and 100 percent in 1995 and subsequent years. 
Preemption of state-mandated benefits: States cannot mandate 
benefits beyond those in the standard benefit package, but they 
can establish more stringent requirements in other areas. 
Guaranteed eligibility: Insurer cannot exclude any eligible em-
ployee or dependent to whom the employer offers coverage. 
Guaranteed issue: Insurers offering a plan to small employers in 
a community must offer it to all employers in the area year round. 
Waiting periods are allowed if applied to all employees. 
Minimum plan period: Rating basis applies for 12 months. 
Guaranteed renewability: Insurers only can nonrenew and cancel 
for nonpayment of premiums, fraud, misrepresentation, or failure 
to maintain minimum participation rates. 
Notice of renewal (expiration): Insurers must give notice 60 days 
prior to the renewal date. Terms of renewal must be the same as 
at issue except for premiums and administrative changes. 
Discrimination based on health status: Insurers cannot deny, 
limit, or condition coverage or benefits based on an individual's 
"health status, claims experience, receipt of medical care, medical 
history or lack of evidence of insurability." An exception is made 
to this provision to allow for the preexisting condition exclusion. 
Index rate variation between blocks: This must be less than 20 
percent unless the block is one that always has provided open en-
rollment, the insurer never has transferred groups into the block 
involuntarily, and the block is currently available for purchase 
when an exception to the 20 percent rule is sought. 
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Community rating: Must be used within a block. 
Age and sex adjustments: This may be used if applied consis-
tently to all small employers. Maximum variation is ±25 percent. 
Definition of community: Not smaller than an MSA. 
Types of family enrollment: Insurers must have separate rates 
for single adults, childless couples, single parents, and families. 
Transfers among blocks: Insurer cannot force an employer to 
transfer among blocks and may not transfer an employer unless 
the transfer is offered to all small employer plans and unless it is 
not based on demographics, experience, or date of issue. 
limits on rate increases: Increase may not exceed the percentage 
change in the base premium rate plus 5 percent (500 basis points). 
Definitions: 
1. A block (of business) consists of the small employer plans is-
sued by an insurer. Distinct groups can be treated as separate 
blocks based on whether the group is marketed through di-
rect response, has been acquired from another insurer, or is 
provided via an association of at least 25 small employers. 
2. The reference premium rate is the lowest rate charged or 
available to any actuarial class. 
3. The index rate is 133 1/3 percent of the reference premium 
rate. 
4. The base premium rate, though not specifically defined, can 
be defined to be the index rate. 
Standard benefit package: 
1. In general, same as Parts A and B of Medicare. 
2. Unlimited inpatient hospital coverage for children without 
coinsurance. (The deductible is not excluded.) 
3. Maternity (including prenatal, inpatient labor and delivery, 
postnatal, and postnatal family planning). 
4. The $250/500 deductible is indexed for future inflation. 
5. The individual out-of-pocket limit of $2500/3000 is indexed 
for inflation in future years. 
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6. Preventive services must be provided without deductible or 
coinsurance. These services include: maternity, well-child 
care (including dental), screening mammography, screening 
pap smear, colorectal screening, and certain immunizations. 
Others may be added at a later date. Their are limitations on 
what providers may charge for these. Effective 1/1/92. 
Self-insurance prohibition: Small employers (two to 50 employ-
ees, including self-employed) may not self insure. This is enforced 
through a 25 percent excise tax on health care expenditures by 
self-insured plans. 
Preexisting condition limitation (PCL) for all groups: Limits pre-
existing condition exclusion to six months with a further proviso 
that prior coverage must be credited toward the six months as 
long as there isn't more than a three month lapse in coverage. 
PCL cannot be applied to newborns and is defined as a condition 
diagnosed or treated during the three months prior to issue. This 
applies to all employers. Effective 1/1/93. 
Other portability provisions: In addition to the PCL, the portabil-
ity provisions are an excise tax for failure to provide all of these 
portability benefits (25 percent of gross premium for plan); a pro-
hibition against denying, limiting, or conditioning coverage (or 
benefits) on health status; and a continuity of coverage provision 
that mandates credit for prior coverage if no more than a three 
month break in coverage has occurred. All of the portability provi-
sions apply to all group health plans, regardless of size, including 
self-insured plans. 
Cost containment: This includes optional rates (prices) for hos-
pitals, physicians and other medical prOviders, DRGs, and RBRVS. 
Any health care purchaser, including individuals, can choose to 
use promulgated rates. Providers must accept these rates as pay-
ment in full. 
Uniform claims forms: Effective 1/1/94. 
Uniform reporting standards: For development of rates (prices) 
to be used in cost containment efforts. Effective 1/1/93. 
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Appendix C: H.R. 3626: The Impact of Migration 
Table Cl 
Assumptions for Migration Modeling Under the 
Optimistic, Best Estimate, and Pessimistic Scenarios 
Assumption Optimistic Best Estimate Pessimistic 
Total Market 45,000,000 50,000,000 55,000,000 
Distribution (before reforms): 
A. Employer-sponsored 55% 51.36% 50.0% 
B. Individually-insured 20% 22.31% 22.5% 
C. Uninsured 25% 26.33% 27.5% 
Morbidity of Population as a 
Percentage of Employer-
Sponsored Net Claims Cost 
(before migration): 
A. Employer-sponsored 100.00% 100.00% 100% 
B. Individually-insured 100.00% 100.00% 120% 
C. Uninsured 75.04% 80.62% 102% 
Employer-Sponsored Insureds 
Withdrawing From Small 
Employer Market: 
A. % withdrawing 5% 10% 15% 
B. Morbidity 24% 32% 40% 
Individually Insureds 
Withdrawing From Small 
Employer Market: 
A. % withdrawing 5% 5% 5% 
B. Morbidity 100% 120% 120% 
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Table Cl (continued) 
Assumptions for Migration Modeling Under the 
Optimistic, Best Estimate and Pessimistic Scenarios 
Assumption Optimistic Best Estimate Pessimistic 
Additions of Uninsureds to 
Small Employer Market: 
A. Percentage of uninsureds 
who are medically 
uninsurable 7% 10% 12% 
B. Percentage of medically 
uninsurables purchasing 
coverage after reforms 25% 50% 100% 
C. Percentage of all 
uninsureds purchasing 
coverage after reforms 5% 10% 15% 
D. Morbidity of medically 
uninsurables 248.08% 248.08% 300% 
E. Morbidity of uninsureds 
who are not medically 
uninsurable 62.02% 62.02% 75.00% 
Note: Total Market = Population (employees and dependents) in small employer market before 
any changes 
Table C2 
Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms (Without Guaranteed Issue): 
Basic Set of Assumptions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total Market (before migration): 
A. ER' -sponsored Insureds 25,680,000 51.36% 100.00% $1,470.74 1.95 
B. Individually insured 11,155,000 22.31% 100.00% $1,470.74 1.95 
C. Uninsured 13.165.000 26.33% 80.62% $1,185.71 1.45 
TOTAL 50,000,000 100.00% 94.90% $1,395.69 1.79 
Impact of Migration on: 
ER-Sponsored Insureds: 
A. Withdraw from markett 2,568,000 10.0% 32.00% $470.64 1.95 
B. Remain in market 23,112,000 90.0% 107.56% $1,581.86 1.95 
Subtotal 25,680,000 100.00% 
Individually Insureds: 
A. Migrate to SGM* 557,750 5.0% 120.00% $1,764.89 1.95 
B. Remain individually insured 10.597,250 95.0% 98.95% $1,455.26 1.95 






























A. -MUIs migrating to SGM 
-Insurables entering SGM 
B. Uninsureds who remain 
Subtotal 
Total Market (after migration): 
A. ER-sponsored insureds 











5.0% 248.08% $3,648.61 
5.0% 62.02% $912.15 
90.0% 72.35% $1,064.08 
100.0% 
49.97% 110.34% $1,622.75 
21.19% 98.95% $1,455.26 
28.83% 65.16% $958.37 
100.00% 94.90% $1,395.69 








(3) Ratio of Net claim Costs to Market Cost (Market Cost = $1470.74); (4) Cost Per Covered life; and (5) Average Family Size. 
Data in columns (2) to (5) are rounded to two decimal places. 
·ER = Employer. 
tThese withdrawing employer-sponsored insureds are now considered as uninsured. 
'SGM = Small group market. 





































Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms (Without Guaranteed Issue): 
Calculations Using Data From Table C2 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
Total Market (before migration): 
A. Employer-sponsored insureds 37,768,603,200 13,169,231 $2,867.94 $239.00 
B. Individually insured 16,406,104,700 5,720,513 $2,867.94 $239.00 I..-0 
C. Uninsured 9,079,310 $1,719.28 $143.27 s:: 15,609.879,891 .... 
::l 
TOTAL 69,784,587,791 27,969,054 $2,495.06 $207.92 ~ 
0 
...., 
Impact of Migration on: :t> n 
..... 
Employer-Sponsored Insureds: s:: III 
A. Withdraw from market 1,208,595,302 1,316,923 $917.74 $76.48 ~. ~ 





Individually Insured: !:!. n 
A. Migrate to small group market 984,366,282 286,026 $3,441.53 $286.79 -(I) 
B. Remain individually insured 15,421,738,418 5,434,487 $2,837.75 $236.48 < 0 
N 
Uninsured: Z 
A. Uninsured MUIs' migrating 2,401,698,712 453,966 $5,290.49 $440,87 0 
Insurable migrants 600,424,678 453,966 $1,322.62 $110.21 
Subtotal migrating 3,002,123,390 907,931 $3,306.55 $275.55 1.0 
1.0 
B. Uninsureds who remain 12,607,756,501 8,171,379 $1,542.92 $128.57 ..j::. 
Total Market (after migration): 
A. Employer-sponsored insureds 40,546,497,570 13,046,264 $3,107.90 $258.99 
B. Individually insured 15,421,738,418 5,434,487 $2,837.75 $236.48 
C. Uninsured 13,816,351,803 9,488,302 $1,456.15 $121.35 
TOTAL 69,784,587,791 27,969,054 $2,495.06 $207.92 
Note: Column headings are as follows: (6) Total Cost; (7) Number of Covered Employees; (8) Annual Cost Per Employee; 
(9) Monthly Cost Per Employee. 
'MuIs = Medically uninsureds. 

































Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms: 
Increase in Employer-Sponsored Insured Small Group Net Claim Cost 
due to Guarantees and Other Benefits After Reforms 
(Calculations Using Data From Tables C2 and C3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Guarantees! 10.3% $152.01 $2,777,894,370 $239.96 $20.00 
Other Benefits2 4.0% $58.83 $1,469,931,093 $112.67 $9.39 
TOTAL 14.3% $210.84 $4,247,825,463 $352.63 $29.39 
Percentage Change 14.3% 11.2% 12.3% 12.3% 
Note: Column headings are as follows: (1) Increase in the Ratio of Net Claim Costs to Market Cost; 
(2) Increase in the Cost Per Covered life; (3) Increase in the Total Cost; (4) Increase in the Annual Cost Per 
Employee; and (5) Increase in the Monthly Cost Per Employee. 
IThese include guaranteed issue, eligibility, and renewability; community rating; and rating restrictions. 
%ese include preexisting condition limits, self-employment deduction, preventive services, elimination of 
mandates, cost containment, and the standard benefit package. 
Column (1): 10.3% is taken from 110.34% in Table C2, column; and 4.0% is based on information in Section 5. 
Column (2) = Column (1) x 1470.74. 





























Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms: 
ER-Sponsored Net Claim Cost After Reforms (Migrations, Guarantees, and limits Included) 


















(3) (4) (5) 
















Note: Colurrm headings are as follows: (1) Number of Covered lives; (2) Percentage of Total Number of Employer-Sponsored lnsureds; (3) Ratio of 
Net Claim Costs to Market Cost (Market Cost = $1470.74); (4) Cost Per Covered Life; (5) Total Cost; (6) Average Family Size; (7) Number of Covered 
Employees; and (8) Annual Cost Per Employee. 
*ER = Employer. 
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